Why Is Iran’s Influence in the Arab World Declining? A Look at the New Regional Line-Up

By Barry Rubin

Often, coverage of the Middle East in the mainstream media is beyond belief. Even when the article has good information it often misses the main point. Such is the case with an article in the Wall Street Journal, “Arab Spring Turns Up Heat on Iran.” The article correctly reports that Iran is losing popularity in much of the Arab world:

In Egypt, favorable views of Iran declined from 89 percent in 2006 to 37 percent today. In Saudi Arabia those holding such beliefs declined from 85 percent to 6 percent; and in Jordan from 75 percent to 23 percent. That’s an incredibly steep decline. Incidentally, in these countries, attitudes toward the United States remained highly unfavorable and only got worse under President Obama.

A reader who doesn’t have any understanding of the region–a category probably including most Western leaders, academic “experts,” and journalists–would think: Aha! Democracy is triumphing over radical Islamism. Iran is no longer much of a threat These are great things! This is how the media is presenting this development and no doubt that’s what Western policymakers think.

Such an analysis, however, is ridiculous so I’m glad you are reading this article. Don’t stop now. Here comes the good and original part.

So Egyptians, Jordanians, and Saudis are turning away from Iran. Now what do these three countries have in common? Answer: they all have big Sunni majorities, 90 percent in Saudi Arabia, 100 percent in Jordan, and 100 percent of the Muslims–who form about 90 percent of the whole population–in Egypt.

So where is Iran losing popularity? Among Sunni Muslim Arabs. Why? Because now they have their own Sunni Muslim Arab Islamists and don’t need Iran’s Shia Persians to be their patrons, leaders, or hope for the triumph of Islamism. Thus, this development shows the deepening schism between Sunni and Shia Muslims and Islamists, not declining support for radical, anti-Western, and Islamist politics.

Read this paragraph from the article:

“Iran and Syria—together with Shiite political and militant group Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas—have for years banked on their anti-Israeli, anti-American posture as a guarantee for popular support in the Arab street as well as a shield against domestic unrest. Iran saw itself as the leader of this resistance group.”

Notice that only Hizballah is identified as Shia Muslim. Actually, the sentence is so poorly constructed one might well think that Hamas is Shia, too, which it isn’t!

True, the article notes in passing: “Its allies supported Iran’s growing influence while rival Sunni Arab countries including Saudi Arabia viewed it as a threat.” But that’s hardly making the point clear.

There’s one more complicating factor: a deep split in the Sunni camp, though, since a radical nationalist and semi-Islamist Egypt headed by Amr Moussa (and aligned with Hamas) is the Saudis worse nightmare. Moreover, Sunni states will not give strong backing to the Palestinian Authority because they’re angry due to its past behavior, despite their general backing for the “Palestinian cause” (including unanimous support for a Palesitinian unilateral declaration of independence).

So here’s the likely line-up:

Shia:

• Radicals: Iran, Hizballah, Syria, Bahrain opposition radical faction

• Moderates: Iranian opposition, Iraqi government; Bahrain opposition moderate faction.

Sunni

• Radicals: Egypt, Hamas, Libya?, Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Jordan, Sudan, Turkish regime.

• Moderates: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanese, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, moderate forces in Syrian opposition, Tunisia, Turkish opposition.

This line-up tells us precisely what needs to be done. The United States should take leadership and work with Europe, Israel, and the moderates of both the Sunni and Shia variety. As for the radicals, none of them are “good guys” who can be allies in the battle against revolutionary Islamism.

A good strategy would not side with Sunni against Shia or vice-versa, nor would it have any illusion about moderating the radicals through appeasement, flattery, or concessions.

What is worrisome is that few Western leaders understand any of these points.

A final note, I didn’t mention the Palestinian Authority (PA). That is partly due to the fact that it isn’t very important in regional politics. While it is Sunni, it doesn’t get real support from either the radicals or the moderates in that camp. The radicals prefer their fellow Islamists in Hamas; the moderates are mostly angry at past backstabbings by the PA leadership. Everyone pretends to love the Palestinians and they will all vote for unilateral Palestinian independence at the UN, badmouth Israel, and compete for control over the Palestinian card. Yet in terms of genuine material support or patronage, the PA is very isolated while Hamas is in a much more favorable position regionally.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). GLORIA Center site is http://www.gloria-center.org.His articles published originally outside of PajamasMedia are at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com> 

Israel’s Strategic Situation: Plenty to Worry About But Little to Fear

By Barry Rubin



Since much of what I write about regional politics seems pessimistic, I periodically remind people why I’m an optimist, at least when it comes to Israel.

Even today, Israel’s security situation is as good as or better than it has been since any time since the establishment of the state. The two main threats have always been either a potential attack by most or all Arab armies or a high level of successful cross-border terrorism.

At present, though, by Israeli standards, these two threats are relatively low. The immediate problem is rocket, missile, and mortar attacks from the Gaza Strip. The longer-term threat—that seems to be continually postponed--is an Iranian nuclear capability

On the level of threats from states, the problem is relatively minimal. The Saudis and Gulf Arabs, whose economic support would be vital in any confrontation, don’t want war with Israel. The same point applies to Jordan. Syria is militarily weaker than ever and entangled in a revolution whose effects will convulse the country for years whatever the outcome.

Muammar Qadhafi’s likely overthrow in Libya won’t bring a friendlier regime but will reduce the sponsorship of international terrorism arising from his personal ambitions. Similarly, Iraq has dropped out of the conflict and turned inward, while the Kurdish-ruled sector in the north is friendly toward Israel. A new addition to that short friendly list is the Republic of South Sudan.

What of Iran? The “Arab Spring” may be a victory for Sunni Muslim Islamism but for that reason is an Iranian defeat. Tehran’s ambition of being hegemonic in the Middle East is blocked since it can no longer hope to become leader over the majority Sunni Muslims. Its rival, the Muslim Brotherhood, is the single most powerful force in Egypt, has “stolen” Hamas from Iran, and may do the same with Syria.

Moreover, Iran is taking far longer to get nuclear weapons than expected due to technical and other problems. The regime also faces potential internal revolt. Of course, Iran is a legitimate Israeli concern but the threat today is far less than it was expected to be several years ago. The likelihood of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear installation has also dropped sharply.

This leaves Egypt. For the moment, the military regime wants to maintain the peace treaty. That could change when an elected government comes to power, especially with a strong Muslim Brotherhood contingent in parliament. The most likely president, Amr Moussa, doesn’t like Israel but he is also experienced and pragmatic enough to avoid a confrontation, even though he is also demagogic enough to talk tough. Egypt is going to be a problem for Israeli security but it might be manageable.

As for non-state actors, to the north, Hizballah is having trouble controlling Lebanon. The loss of its Syrian patron and growing Sunni-Shia tensions make its task tougher. Hizballah doesn’t want a war with Israel now and during the next few years. The threat must be closely watched and no assumptions made, but that front should remain relatively quiet.

The big problem is Hamas, especially as it tries to leverage Egypt into a conflict. Nobody is going to throw Hamas out of power and periodically it will periodically send barrages of missiles and rockets into Israel. Yet if this is Israel’s main security problem it is hardly existential..

A third intifadah on the West Bank is also possible but would be far costlier to the Palestinians than to Israel. Whatever the UN General Assembly decides will change nothing on the ground. The Fatah-Hamas conflict won’t go away and the demographic issue is totally phony. Israel’s intelligence and counterterrorism is in good shape.

Time is not against Israel but it is against the Arabs. They are splintering rather than uniting. Each country faces some level of civil war between Islamists and nationalists, monarchies and oppositions, and religious-communal groups.
We are going to be seeing more assertive Kurdish (in Syria and Iraq) and Berber movements (in North Africa). The Sunni-Shia rift is heating up. Two Islamist blocs will contend, sometimes violently as we have seen in Iraq. True, both sides hate Israel but they are hardly likely to cooperate against it, and neither has a superpower ally.

The vision of a united Arab or Muslim world wiping Israel off the map—or making a serious effort to do so—is as distant as always, more distant than from the 1950s into the 1970s. The Arab Spring is in fact the start of an internal Arab political winter, 20 to 40 years fighting over who will run each country. While they fritter away money, resources, and energy, Israel will continue to advance economically and militarily.

Disastrous populist, radical nationalist, and Islamist domestic policies will also slow Arab development and widen Israel’s advantage. I do not rejoice at the Arab world’s self-made misfortune. A prosperous, happy, moderate, and democratic Arab world at peace with Israel would be a wonderful thing. But that won’t happen. Neither will there be a prosperous, united, radical Islamist world at war with Israel.

As for Israel itself, when one gets beyond all of the usual self-flagellating self-criticism, it is a strong country in both economic and military terms. Israel has weathered the international economic crisis better than any other developed country. When Israelis have time to bicker over housing and cottage cheese prices, it’s a sure sign of an improved security situation and relative consensus on “foreign conflict” issues.

There are, of course, no lack of problems and threats. Yet Israel is in good shape when compared in strategic terms to every other country between Morocco and Pakistan—and even in social and economic terms compared with virtually every European country.

Appendix:


A reader, trying to explore every possible pessimistic scenario, asked me some questions in addition to the above text. Obviously, Israeli policymakers and military officers are thinking about such things--and they should be--but these aren't realistic threats. Below are brief answers:

What are the risks of a military confrontation between Turkey and Israel should Turkey send warships to accompany “civilian” ships trying to reach Gaza ? A defense pact between Turkey and Hamas, Egypt or Hizballah/Lebanon?

--Won't happen in any meaningful way. Erdogan does not want to embroil Turkey in a costly and unnecessary international confrontation that would sacrifice U.S. support, frighten international investors, and divide Turkey. Erdogan's motive is domestic political gain for his plan to Islamize Turkey through demagoguery. He knows precisely what he's doing. And the Arabs neither want nor need Turkish boots on the ground. That would be a public relations' disaster from their standpoint.

Might Syria fire some chemical weapons at Israel as a last ditch to save itself?

--There is no indication of that happening and the Iraqis--who had much more motive to do it--didn't follow that path in 2003. Israel would have plenty of warning time and could take countermeasures. Not a realistic scenario.

--Will Iran let Syria fall and lose her investment ?

--I think clearly Iran cannot determine Syria's future. It is trying to save the Assad dictatorship but already there are signs that Tehran is thinking of jumping ship. Too much effort to help the Syrian regime will create an intense anti-Shia and anti-Persian feeling among Sunni Muslims and be more negative for Iran than even the fall of the Syrian regime.

What about Israel’s porous border with Sinai....and the rush to now build a security fence ? Why was this not done before ?

--Because Israel doesn't have unlimited money and resources. Notice those mass demonstrations wanting the government to spend more money on housing and other things to benefit Israel's people? It cannot spend millions to build new security fences and ask people to devote more reserve days to military service without a clear need to do so.

What is the prospect of an Islamic (Sunni) curtain stretching from Morocco to Turkey....even with temporary gaps in the curtain ?

--If you mean Islamist regimes that's doubtful. It isn't happening in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan or in Saudi Arabia--in the sense we mean it--and the Gulf Arab monarchies. It also isn't going to happen in Lebanon or Iraq which are dominated politically by Shia Muslims.

Will Jordan survive a MB take over of Egypt and the subsequent support by Egypt to Islamists in Jordan ?

Yes, indeed the better the Brotherhood does in Egypt, Libya, or Syria, the more the remaining non-Islamist states will work harder and act tougher to prevent their meeting that fate. Increasingly, the Saudis and other Gulf Arab monarchies are taking Jordan under their protection and the monarchy in Amman has basically brought the unrest there to a standstill, though they could use a lot more foreign economic help.


With Europe increasingly scared of its own muslim populations...what will this mean for Israel’s trade, security cooperation ?

--Trade? Nothing. Security cooperation? Precisely because of nervousness about Islamists at home and in the Middle East, a number of European countries--notably France, Italy, and Germany are increasing security cooperation with Israel. European states can play their usual game of pro-Palestinian rhetoric combined with little or no action in order to cover themselves.

What will Israel do should Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria all start firing missiles into Israel at same time ?

Syria won't. If Damascus attacked Israel it would be the end of the regime. Rather than mobilize mass support, as in the past, Syria's regime would have its armed forces heavily damaged and fall within a week or two, with very poor prospects for the life spans of its elite. As for Hizballah-Hamas cooperation, that's less likely than ever. Those two groups are now on different sides of the Sunni-Shia divide and didn't even work together in 2008-2009 when they were much closer to each other. Reportedly, Hamas asked for help and Hizballah refused, unwilling to risk its own interests to help its "brothers" in the Gaza Strip.

How strong relatively is Israel ?

--Much more so than its neighbors.

The above analysis isn't based on wishful thinking. But there are good reasons why the worst-case scenarios we can think up don't happen. As I said in the original article, my biggest concern is that Hamas will try to drag a post-election Egypt into a war with Israel. Other than that, remaining scenarios of war or high-level terrorism are unlikely.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). GLORIA Center site is http://www.gloria-center.org.His articles published originally outside of PajamasMedia are at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com>

WARNING! By The End of This Year Egypt Might Be Run By a Radical Islamist Regime

By Barry Rubin

I'm not saying this lightly. For the first time, there is serious evidence not only for an Islamist-controlled parliament but even potentially for an Islamist president! It's iran all over again except in 1979 Carter didn't publicly demand the shah's overthrow and say he had no problem with Khomeini taking over. In fact, that's what Obama did in Egypt.

First the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood said it wouldn't run a candidate for president and would only contest one-third of the parliamentary seats.

Next, it said it wouldn’t run a presidential candidate and contest just 50 percent of the parliamentary seats. Even that is misleading since it could arrange with other Islamist parties not to compete against each other, thus potentially adding 5 to 10 percent more Islamists, that is a majority, to parliament..

Now, the Muslim Brotherhood says it will run a presidential candidate who might even conceivably win the election. Oh, but he will run as an independent. So that doesn’t count?

One reason for this change on the presidential election is that earlier on the Brotherhood was backing Muhammad ElBaradei. But since the two broke up over the referendum regarding the election timing and rules--ElBaradei thought the changes were too favorable to the Brotherhood so they dropped him--they had no one to support. By the way, the Brotherhood won that referendum by a landslide.

Ah, but it's okay because, according to Reuters, Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, the Brotherhood’s candidate for president is a leading "reformist member" of the Brotherhood's Shura Council, its highest governing body. Right! He wants to reform Egypt into being an Islamist state.

An al-Ahram poll (it's still early, of course, to know how people will vote) shows Amr Moussa and Abul Futuh are tied at 20 percent with ElBaradei at 12 percent.

Note that since a presidential election would come after a strong Brotherhood showing in the parliamentary election, a lot of voters would be likely to want to join what seems to be the winning side. Also note that the Brotherhood candidate will have a strong organization behind him while Moussa won’t even have a party at all and ElBaradei’s forces should be pretty weak and concentrated largely in Cairo.

Then add into the mix that Abul Futuh will also be supported by non-Brotherhood Islamists while ElBaradei is running against three other “moderate democratic” types in competition for that sector of the votes.

The bottom line is that for the first time this week a Brotherhood takeover of Egypt in 2011 is really possible. Let me underline that point: before one could conceive that this might happen. Now there is hard evidence and real reason to believe that it might actually take place.

Up until now, I had thought that Amr Moussa might be Egypt’s next president with a strong Islamist presence in parliament but not a majority or near-majority. But now Moussa himself predicts that the Brotherhood will have, along with its allies, a majority. And even more recently it is possible that a Brotherhood leader will be elected president.

So here are our alternatives:

• Best-case scenario: A radical nationalist president, Moussa, and a strong Islamist contingent in parliament that will also have a big influence in writing the new Constitution. Moussa is anti-Israel and anti-American but might be restrained by his pragmatic streak. On the other hand, the need to play demagogue—he won’t have any money to subsidize food more and provide additional jobs—and to keep the Islamists happy or even outbid them—pushes him toward adventurism.

• Worst-case scenario: A Brotherhood president and parliament transforming Egypt into an Islamist state, backing Hamas fully, subverting U.S. influence and other Arab states, and potentially playing jihad in a full-scale war with Israel.

Remember that President Barack Obama said that having the Brotherhood in government is okay with him. So I guess he'll just watch the result of his handiwork and cheer on the results of the process he helped set in motion.

A taste of the future was provided by the massive anti-Israel demonstrations in Cairo today.

Supposedly the rally was to protest sectarian violence within Egypt but it turned into one favoring more sectarian violence next door.

The Brotherhood has now escalated its demands to breaking diplomatic relations with Israel and expelling the Israeli ambassador. Remember all of those articles and statements about how the revolution was good for Israel if only those silly Israelis woke up and understand reality as well as people in Washington DC and the Upper West Side of Manhattan?

Oh, and guess how the demonstration was largely organized. Ready? On Facebook! Hahaha. Those youthful hip twittering moderate young people!

We can also look forward to similar demonstrations in Palestine’s capital, after independence takes place, demanding an abrogation of the Israel-Palestine peace treaty and the end to Israeli occupation of…Israel.

After people finally figured out in April-May what they should have known in January-February about Egypt, might be better to learn the lesson now rather than to repeat the same mistakes infinitely?

PS: Love the AP's "evenhanded" explanation of the Right to Return issue:

"The Palestinians have long maintained that the refugees have a moral and legal right to return to what was once Palestine—including land which is now Israel. But Israel has argued that granting the right of return would compromise the country's identity as the world's only Jewish state."

Yes, all those riots and massive terrorism leading to bloody civil war, with all the neighbors joining in, followed by the genocidal murder of millions of Jews and the transformation of Israel into an Arab and possibly (probably?) Islamist state that would ally with Iran, work to overturn all the region's non-radical regimes, trigger additional wars and massive suffering, and destroy U.S. influence in the Middle East would definitely be an inconvenience.

Ah, but it's okay because, according to Reuters, Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, is a leading "reformist member" of the Brotherhood's Shura Council. Right! He wants to reform Egypt into being an Islamist state.

An al-Ahram poll (it's still early) shows Amr Moussa and Abul Futuh are tied at 20 percent with ElBaradei at 12 percent..

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/ His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is http://www.gloria-center.org. His PajamaMedia columns are mirrored and other articles available at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/.

The NEW Egypt: Radical Nationalist President; Islamist-Dominated Parliament

By Barry Rubin

Amr Moussa, probably Egypt’s next president, has given a comprehensive picture of his views, a foretaste of the likely policies of someone about to become the Arab world's most powerful person. One thing he said is particularly important and shocking. Read on.

Moussa, former Egyptian foreign minister (1991-2001) and head of the Arab League until his resignation takes effect on May 15, is a figure from the Egyptian establishment and the old regime. But which aspect of the old regime: that of the centrist Husni Mubarak, the moderate Anwar al-Sadat, or the radical Arab nationalist Gamal Abd al Nasser?

Moussa is the last Nasserist. He knows that the next president must also be a populist to survive. So he will bash Israel, the United States, and the Egyptian upper class. The hope is that he will be pragmatic enough to restrict his demagoguery to rhetoric.

It might seem ironic that a revolution against the old regime ends up electing as president a figure from the old regime. Yet Moussa perfectly combines experience and name recognition with radicalism. A recent Pew poll shows him with an 89 percent positive rating. Moussa’s prospects look so good because the Islamists aren’t running a presidential candidate. Moderate democrats, restricted to a small urban middle class constituency, can choose among four candidates running against each other, thus further splitting that vote.

Another reason Moussa’s election appears likely is his deft use of the anti-Israel card. So identified is Moussa with hostility to Israel that in 2001 a popular song entitled, "I Hate Israel (I love Amr Moussa)" zoomed to the top of the Egyptian hit parade. Indeed, Moussa is now emphasizing that much of the reason for his break with Mubarak was due to his desire to take a stronger policy against Israel.

Moussa’s basic argument in his Wall Street Journal interview is that Egypt has obtained nothing from peace with Israel and that Israel is completely at fault for the lack of an Israel-Palestinian peace agreement. Of course, Egypt received: the Sinai's return; the reopening of its oilfields and the Suez Canal; and the opportunity for more trade, tourism, and a lower military budget. Failure to take advantage of the latter points was due to Egyptian decisions.

In addition, Egypt and Israel had what amounts to an alliance against revolutionary Islamism, particularly Hamas in the Gaza Strip. President Moussa will reverse this policy and see Hamas as an ally, albeit one that he won’t trust and might try to restrain.

Hamas is now starting to believe that by attacking Israel it will have the power to draw Egypt into a war with Israel. If that view is not countered decisively by the next Egyptian government, the result will be a return to the 1960s and a terrible major conflict. Unfortunately, the current U.S. government cannot be counted on to see and help eliminate that problem.

As the Wall Street Journal accurately notes: “U.S. and European officials said they don't see the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in danger in the near term. They say Cairo won't place in jeopardy billions of dollars in aid.”

We’ve seen this kind of economic determinism before and every time it is applied to Middle East states it fails. Examples:

--Yasir Arafat will make peace with Israel because he wants to get a state and huge compensation funding.

--Syria will moderate and turn toward the West and away from Iran in order to get trade and investment.

--Iran would much rather become wealthy than to pursue these silly ideas about spreading Islamist revolution.

Now, here’s what’s really shocking in the interview. To quote the Journal’s account, Moussa, “Described a political landscape in which the Muslim Brotherhood…is dominant. It is inevitable, he said, that parliamentary elections in September will usher in a legislature led by a bloc of Islamists, with the Brotherhood at the forefront.”

Think about that. Even Moussa, who is anti-Islamist, admits this, though Western governments and mass media haven't figured it out yet. He's running as an independent meaning with no political party behind him. Thus, Moussa must constantly compromise with the Islamist majority in parliament that will consist of the Muslim Brotherhood plus even more radical groups.

The alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with even more radical "Salafi" groups--the kind of people who launched a terrorist war in Egypt during the 1990s and who support Usama bin Ladin--is another dangerous development. The Salafis are the ones attacking Christians; the Brotherhood-Salafi alliance has organized two demonstrations outside Israel's embassy. In contrast, there are no riot police present and the demonstrators are allowed to approach closer to the embassy than before.  It's only a matter of time before there's a nasty incident.

Now, just for fun, check out this MEMRI video on the pro-bin Ladin, anti-American demonstration at the al-Nur mosque in Cairo. They chant, "Death to America" and the Islamist chant calling for the slaughter of all Jews. There's also a new one we'll be hearing a lot of in the months to come, "Obama is the enemy of Allah!" There are, what, 2000 people in that one mosque?

Note how young the crowd is. See how they use their state-of-the-art smartphones to taken snapshots of bin Ladin's face in the mosque's place of honor! At least one of them is wearing the jacket of the English national football (soccer) team! Why they might even use Facebook!

The Financial Times reports a speech by Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Badie that when Egypt's parliament meets the Brotherhood, which will have the largest bloc, will propose the following program:

"An end to normalization [with Israel] which has given our enemy stability; an end to [Egyptian] efforts to secure from infiltrators the borders of the Zionists; the abolition of all [joint] economic interests such as the Qualified Industrial Zones agreement and the export of Egyptian gas to Israel."

Note the key point there: "an end to efforts to secure from infiltrators the borders of the Zionists." In other words, to turn Egypt into what the Gaza Strip was in the 1950s, Jordan was in the late 1960s, and Lebanon was in the 1970s: a springboard and safe haven for terrorists attacking Israel across the border. Such a policy can only end in full-scale war.

Isn't it great that now Egypt is a democratic state where people feel free to voice their opinions? Of course, the problem is the nature of those opinions.

Remember this: The Muslim Brotherhood doesn't have to engage in terrorist violence within Egypt because it has allies ready to do so. This is just like Hamas' use of smaller groups to attack Israel from the Gaza Strip and then disclaims responsibility, allowing its apologists to claim that now it's really moderate.

While I doubt that the Islamists will have an outright majority they should come pretty close and thus have one by allying with various radical nationalists, leftists, and independents.  That also means they'll take a leading role in writing Egypt's new constitution.

Moussa makes another important point in the interview. First, after many years in which Egypt was oriented inward, he will reassert a leading Egyptian role in the Arab world. That probably means conciliation with Syria and the recreation of a radical Arab bloc that includes Egypt for the first time in more than 30 years. The best thing that can be said is that neither Iraq nor the Saudis would participate, while the Jordanians would be very wary.

Egypt will no longer be a U.S. ally. The question is the degree to which it will be an enemy of the United States.

Finally, he knows that he will have to deliver economic benefits to the masses. But that probably means higher subsidies and more government jobs, policies that will do nothing to improve Egypt’s economy in a real way. The worse the economy gets, the greater the anti-Israel, anti-American demagoguery will be.

We are able to predict this crisis more than six months ahead of time, yet Western countries, media, and experts have not yet seen what is certainly coming down the road toward us.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/ His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is http://www.gloria-center.org. His PajamaMedia columns are mirrored and other articles available at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.

Crisis Egypt: Situation Deteriorating Badly and Rapidly

By Barry Rubin

In the wake of bloody Muslim attacks on Egyptian Christians the New York Times informs us:

"By lifting the heavy hand of the Mubarak police state, the revolution unleashed long-suppressed sectarian animosities that have burst out with increasing ferocity...."

No kidding! Did you think a single Egyptian Christian didn't know this in February? Why didn't the media report or the U.S. government understand that this was absolutely inevitable and predictable. But the only mentions of Christians were to claim that they were really enthusiastic about the revolution.

The remaining Christians in most of the Arabic-speaking world may be on the edge of flight or extinction. All of the Christians have left the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip which is, in effect, an Islamist republic. They are leaving the West Bank. Half have departed from an increasingly Islamist-oriented Iraq where they are under terrorist attack. Within a few years they might all be gone.

In Lebanon while the Christians are holding their own there is a steady emigration. As for Syria, the community has generally supported the Asad regime fearing a revolutionary Islamist replacement. One dissident recalled that as he was being beaten in a Syrian prison a few years ago the police yelled at him, "Why are you doing this? You're a Christian!"

Egypt has more Christians than Israel's entire population. There have been numerous attacks, with the latest in Cairo leaving 12 dead, 220 wounded, and two churches burned. The Western media generally attributes this to inter-religious battles. Yet Egypt's Christians, so totally outnumbered and not having any access to the power of the state, have generally kept a low profile.

It is hard to believe that gangs of Christians go out and attack Muslims, especially when the fighting revolves around mobs attacking churches.  “How can they say we started it when we are defending our church?” asked one Christian. That makes sense.    

The Christians cannot depend on any support from Western churches or governments. Will there be a massive flight of tens or even hundreds of thousands of Christians from Egypt in the next few years?

The U.S. government has just announced that it will forgive about $1 billion of Egyptian debt at a time when the American economy isn't doing so well. You can just bet that there are no political strings attacked: no pressure over Egyptian backing of Hamas, growing anti-Israel policy, cutting off natural gas supplies, the increasingly difficult situation of Christians, opposing Iran's ambitions and nuclear weapons' drive, or anything else.

What will happen if and when an Islamist-dominated regime is in power in Egypt--which could happen as early as September? Will U.S. aid and support continue?

Up until now, the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood has been badly underestimated in the West. But increasingly it is also apparent that the strength of anti-Islamist forces has been overestimated.

I have noted that even Amr Moussa, likely to be Egypt's next president and a radical nationalist, has predicted an Islamist majority in parliament. That should be a huge story yet has been largely ignored.

He is not creating his own party, meaning that a President Moussa will be dependent on the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament. Rather than the radical nationalists battling the Islamists these two forces might well work together.

And who will they be working against? Just guess.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/http://www.gloria-center.org/. His PajamaMedia columns are mirrored and other articles available at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is