By Barry Rubin
It’s truly remarkable about how international diplomacy on the Middle East, especially Israel-Palestinian issues, is so out of touch with reality. Consider the Quartet’s response to the mess at the UN. The proposal is for Israel-PA talks to start within a month, both sides to present proposals on borders and security within three months, and to reach a final agreement by the end of 2012.
This is insane. The premise here is that the PA is really eager to negotiate a compromise agreement with Israel. Everything that’s happened in the past three years—indeed the last 18 years since the Oslo agreement was signed—shows the exact opposite. The PA spent a year building its campaign for unilateral independence at the UN precisely to avoid negotiating with Israel at all.
Why then create a Western policy that is not only doomed to fail but certain to fail in the most obvious and humiliating way? The Palestinians won’t negotiate in a month, they won’t rush to present any proposals in three, and they certainly won’t reach a peace treaty in a year. It looks like the PA will reject the whole proposal—a step for which they will pay no penalty but in fact will get more rewards and concessions, and thus will be encouraged to ignore the West even more.
The dumbest possible thing to do is to put a strict time limit on talks when your spoiled and rejectionist “client” doesn’t want to cooperate. The outcome will make the PA look very bad but “fortunately” the media and Western governments won’t point that out. Instead, the PA will run out the one-year deadline, then complain that Israel is at fault and doesn’t really want peace. and then urge speedy Western concessions to the PA and pressures on Israel.
Could anything possibly be more predictable? Perhaps the only possible explanation is that the U.S. government, UN, and EU (I doubt the Russians do so) believe their own propaganda. They really think the PA can’t wait to make a deal if only Israel is forced to negotiate and some more concessions are offer. Haven’t they learned anything?
In addition, perhaps in a time when claimed victimhood is the only measure of what is just, morale, and proper for foreign policy, the Western governments can’t get out of the rut of seeing the Palestinians only as victims. This requires the West to “help” them escape victimhood as fast as possible. Instead, the Palestinian leadership’s goal is the “old-fashioned” concept of total victory and turning their adversaries into total victims.
They don’t want to cease being “victims”; they want to start being conquerers. Consequently, the Western governments think the Palestinians are in a hurry to improve their lot while, in fact, they are patient in seeking instead to grind Israel into the dust.
Meanwhile, veteran Fatah leader Abbas Zaki has openly explained that the whole UN gambit is an effort to get an independent state as a step toward wiping Israel off the map. If Western journalists, experts, government official, and various “peacemakers” understood how this truly represents the Palestinian position a lot of money, time, and lives would be saved.
Twice before the world has sought to prevent the Islamists from governing — after Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections and, a year later, when it formed a coalition with Fatah. Twice, the world made a mess of things. The balance sheet is unequivocal: Hamas remains entrenched in Gaza; Fatah is no stronger; and, without elections or genuine pluralistic political life, democratic institutions in the Palestinian territories have rusted.
Sometimes facts are just inconvenient things. What Malley refuses to mention that that it was Hamas that threw out the "democratic institutions" with a military operation that threw Fatah out of Gaza. And a major reason Hamas and Fatah haven't reconciled before was Hamas' desire to perpetuate its violence against Israel--omething it has done very well, when you consider the fact that since Hamas took over Gaza, it is responsible for launching over 5,000 missiles, mortars, etc., into civilian areas of Israel.
The only reason Fatah is ready to unite with Hamas despite its more blatant violence, is that in September they intend to get the United Nations General Assembly's help in unilaterally declaring an Arab Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital. They need the cooperation of Hamas to get this through.
The most persuasive case against unity has been that it would dash prospects for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Even then, this was never a particularly convincing argument. For it was hard to imagine a fractured national movement reaching a peace agreement, let alone implementing and sustaining it. Palestinian reconciliation was more likely a prerequisite than an obstacle to peace.Oh boy, Uncle Yassir would be so proud. Again Malley is not being truthful. Since Netanyahu became prime minister, he as called for a two-state solution and constantly called for negotiations. When Netanyahu enacted his ten-month building freeze, PA President Abbas waited nine months to agree to talk and used the scheduled end of the freeze to stop talking. More than once during the past few years, Abbas has refused to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and has insisted in order for there to be peace millions of Palestinians must be allowed to move into Israel as to negate its Jewish majority.
But now? The peace process is lifeless. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have not met in months. Palestinians, convinced that they will get nothing from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and little from the United States, are focused on getting the U.N. General Assembly to endorse their call for statehood. In this context, Netanyahu’s insistence that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas choose between peace with Israel or peace with Hamas is the emptiest of threats.
Giving credit where it is due, Malley does have one thing correct: with the "Arab Awakening" throughout the Middle East, existing regimes are more likely to be replaced with governments even more radical.
For Hamas, Mubarak’s fall likewise was decisive. An Egyptian government more in tune with public opinion coupled with a more powerful Muslim Brotherhood — Hamas’s parent organization — augurs a far warmer bilateral relationship. Growing unrest in Syria is another factor. The embattled Syrian regime, having offered safe harbor to Hamas’s leadership for a decade, wants to collect the rent — through overt signs of loyalty and support. Hamas has officially backed the regime but tepidly, out of reluctance to alienate its power base of Palestinian refugees and conservative Sunnis in Syria and beyond. Hamas calculates that even without immediate regime change, the Syrian regime inevitably will be transformed, its brutal crackdown having eroded much of its domestic credibility and regional influence. Tilting toward Cairo, a more important actor in the long run and more legitimate among Hamas’s constituency, was the safer bet. Accepting the Egyptian-brokered deal was a first step.However, he uses that analysis as a stepping stone for more misinformation:
For political and legal reasons, the Obama administration cannot embrace a unity government (his subtle allusion to that nefarious Jewish Lobby)Even under Mubarak, Egypt has always been critical of Israel. The difference we are learning (but Malley ignores) is that it is the "new" Egypt which is critical of Israel and wants to trash the peace. It is not in America's interest to have one Islamist terrorist group to begin to influence an Egyptian government on the precipice of being run by the radical Muslim Brotherhood.
....Beyond discomfort at Cairo’s improved relations with Hamas, is it not in America’s interest to see an influential Egypt critical of Israel yet committed to its peace accord; whose relationship with the United States is strong but not servile, and whose stances are more consistent with domestic and regional opinion?
Might this not weaken Iran, which benefited from using Mubarak’s regime as a foil, and whose regional weight will deflate with the rise of a credible Arab counter-model? How would attempts to torpedo the agreement affect relations with this new Egypt — and, more broadly, with a newly assertive Arab public? Is Washington better off if Hamas feels compelled to drift from Tehran and Damascus toward Cairo? If the Muslim Brotherhood plays a more central role in Egypt, how might it influence Hamas? How might U.S. engagement with the Brotherhood influence that influence?OK let me understand this for a second. The Muslim Brotherhood considers Iran its role model. Hamas and Iran have been allies for a very long time. If Hamas drifts away from Tehran toward Cairo, isn't it drifting back toward Tehran? I know, Malley is just trying to confuse me--either that or trying to mislead the reader.
Then again, that is Malley's modus operandi--confuse, distort and lie, I guess that's what makes him the prefect Middle East guru for an organization "owned" by George Soros. Sadly, when a progressive newspaper such as the Washington Post publishes an op-ed from people like Mr. Malley, whose anti-Israel opinion matches their editorial philosophy, they feel no need to explain his background. This omission is a disservice to the newspaper's readers.










